Introduction

11
A wireless sensor network (WSN) is a distributed network of autonomous sensors that are 12 typically used to collect information about environmental or physical conditions. Wireless sensor modified in au unauthorized manner. 
Elliptic curve cryptosystem
79
The Elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) is the most frequently used password system in modern passwords and has strong security characteristics. Miller [6] and Neal [5] create ECC in 1985 and 1987, respectively. ECC uses the following formula:
The above equation is ECC on the F p . The following conditions must be met in order to ensure safety. 4a 3 + 27b 2 = 0 mod p
This is a formula that guarantees the non-singularity of an elliptic curve. When using this elliptic 3. Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP): Given P, xP it is impossible to find x.
86
We hypothesized that P is the point on F p , xP is the result of calculating P times x, yP is the result 87 of calculating P times y, and xyP is the result of calculating P times xy. 
Fuzzy extractor
89
The user's biometric information is very important information. In general, human biometric 90 recognition is perceived differently each time, and the fuzzy extractor plays a role in correcting it.
91
The fuzzy extractor can obtain a unique string using error tolerance. The fuzzy extractor is operated 
Rep (B * , β) = α (4)
Gen is a function that biometrics B sends a factored out string α ∈ {0, 1} k and a coadjutant string 94 β ∈ {0, 1} * . Rep is function that Gen is a probabilistic generation function for which the biometrics B 95 returns a factored out string α ∈ {0, 1} k and a coadjutant string β ∈ {0, 1} * , and Rep is a function that 96 restore β to α, and any vector BIO * close to BIO [21] . 
Threat assumption
98
We introduce a threat model [8] , and consider constructing the threat assumptions as follows: Table 1 . Notations used in this paper.
Notations Description
U i
The i-th user S j , SID j A j-th sensor and its identity
Random number generated by U i h (·), h 1 (·)
One-way hash function
A group of points on a finite field F p elliptic curve P A point generator in F p with a large prime order n G A cyclic addition group under P as a generator sk u , sk s
The session key generated by U i and S j respectively. 
182
The following problems have been found and are described in detail below.
Extract critical information
1. An attacker A who is a legitimate user and he/she can own his/her smart card. 
gateway node GW N. 3. After receiving the login request message from A, GW N computes
, and checks the validity of ID A and
= h (DID A SID j c j ). If this does not hold, GW N terminates the session; 
Resultingly, the attacker A will be successfully confirmed as GW N by user U i . Hence, the user 229 impersonation attack is successful.
230
In the next section, we discuss Wu et al.'s scheme to overcome the weakness of the scheme. Our 231 scheme stores several variables in the database to prevent the vulnerability of Wu et al.
232
6. Proposed scheme 233 We propose a new three-factor user authentication scheme for wireless sensor networks in this 234 section. We use three participants : the user U i , the gateway node GW N and the sensor node S j . The 235 gateway node GW N creates master keys x. The user U i and the sensor node S j computes on elliptic 236 curve group F p .
237
The proposed scheme composed as follows : registration phase, login phase, authentication phase,
238
and password/biometrics change phase. 5.
, h 1 (.)P} are stored in the smart card. 2. U i generates e i and α.
MU 2 = αP and MU 3 = h (ID i e i GID i MU 2 SID j ). 3. U i sends the message M 1 = {MU 1 , MU 2 , MU 3 , GID i , SID j } to GW N.
264 Figure 2 illustrates the login and authentication phase of the proposed scheme. User U i GW node 
U i computes G new
, P new bi ) for (G 1 , G 2 , P bi ) in the smart card respectively.
Inserts smart card Inputs ID i , P W i , and biometric B * i using ProVerif. The formal security analysis shows the results of verifying and analyzing the security 300 of the proposed scheme using ProVerif.
301
We use three channels. We provide the illustration of Table 2 . cha is the channel in the registration 302 phase and is used when the user U i and GW N exchange ID i in the registration phase. chc is the 303 channel used by user U i and GW N to exchange messages in the login phase and chb is used when registering. R i is a random string made up of the user's biometric information. ID g is the identity of 307 the gateway and SID j is the unique string of the sensor node S j . x is defined as a secret key. P is a 308 generator for creating a session key, which is the initial value used in ECC. The concatenate function 309 and the xor function, including the multiplication in ECC and the hash function h and h 1 , are defined 310 for the events that indicate the start and end of each.
311 Table 3 shows the registration phase of the user U i and the process of the login and authentication 312 phase. Table 4 demonstrates the registration phase and the login and authentication phase of the GW N. Table 5 displays the authentication phase of the sensor node S j . Table 6 shows the query against the 314 attack with the prover-sive, and Table 7 shows the result for Table 6 .
315
When the code that makes up the scheme is executed, ProVerif prints the following results: (*--events--*) event beginUi(bitstring). event endUi(bitstring). event beginGWN(bitstring). event endGWN(bitstring). event beginSj(bitstring). event endSj(bitstring). Table 3 . U i protocol (*--Ui process--*) let Ui = let HPWi = h(concat(concat(IDi, PWi), Ri)) in out(cha,(IDi)); in(cha,(XGIDi:bitstring)); let G1' = h(concat(XGIDi, x)) in let G1 = xor(G1', HPWi) in let G2 = xor(h(concat(concat(IDi, Ri), PWi)), XGIDi) in let G3 = h(concat(IDi, XGIDi)) in event beginUi(IDi); new ei:bitstring; new alpha:bitstring; let GIDi = xor(G2, h(concat(concat(IDi, Ri), PWi))) in if h(concat(IDi, XGIDi)) = G3 then let HPWi = h(concat(concat(IDi, PWi), Ri)) in let MU1 = xor(xor(G1, HPWi), ei) in let MU2 = mult(alpha, P) in let MU3 = h(concat(concat(IDi, ei), concat(concat(XGIDi, MU2), SIDj))) in out(chc,(MU1, MU2, MU3, GIDi, SIDj)); in(chc,(XXMS1:bitstring, XXMS2:bitstring, XMG2:bitstring, XMG3:bitstring, XMG4:bitstring)); let GIDinew = xor(XMG4, h(ei)) in if XMG3 = h(concat(concat(IDi, SIDj), concat(concat(GIDi, GIDinew), concat(ei, XMG2)))) then let sku = mult(alpha, XXMS1) in if XXMS2 = h1(concat(concat(MU2, XXMS1), concat(concat(sku, GIDi), SIDj))) then let G1new = xor(XMG2, xor(h(concat(GIDi, ei)), HPWi)) in let G2new = xor(G2, xor(GIDi, GIDinew)) in let G1 = G1new in let G2 = G2new in event endUi(IDi).
316
Session key disclosure attack
350
The session key should be computed as β or α when knowing αP or βP with αβP. Neither β nor α 351 are not known to the user or the sensor node, so it is impossible to know the session key unless it is a 352 user or a sensor node. 7.2.6. User impersonation attack Table 4 . GW N protocol (*--GWN process--*) let GWN = in(cha, (XIDi:bitstring)); new ri:bitstring; let GIDi = h(concat(XIDi, ri)) in let G1' = h(concat(GIDi, x)) in out(cha, (GIDi)); in(chc, (XMU1:bitstring, XMU2:bitstring, XMU3:bitstring, XGIDi:bitstring, XSIDj:bitstring)); event beginGWN(IDg); let ei = xor(XMU1,h(concat(XGIDi, x))) in if XMU3 = h(concat(concat(XIDi, ei), concat(concat(XGIDi, XMU2), XSIDj))) then let cj = h(concat(XSIDj, x)) in let MG1 = h(concat(concat(cj, XGIDi), concat(XSIDj, XMU2))) in out(chb, (XMU2, MG1, XGIDi)); in(chb, (XMS1:bitstring, XMS2:bitstring, XMS3:bitstring)); if XMS3 = h(concat(concat(XGIDi, XSIDj), cj)) then new rinew:bitstring; let GIDinew = h(concat(XIDi, rinew)) in let MG2 = xor(h(concat(GIDinew, x)), h(concat(XGIDi, ei))) in let MG3 = h(concat(concat(XIDi, XSIDj), concat(concat(XGIDi, GIDinew), concat(ei, MG2)))) in let MG4 = xor(h(ei), GIDinew) in out(chc, (XMS1, XMS2, MG2, MG3, MG4)); event endGWN(IDg). Table 5 . S j protocol (*--Sj process--*) let Sj = in(chb, (XXMU2:bitstring, XMG1:bitstring, XXGIDi:bitstring)); event beginSj(SIDj); let scj = h(concat(SIDj, x)) in if XMG1 = h(concat(concat(scj, XXGIDi), concat(SIDj, XXMU2))) then new beta:bitstring; let MS1 = mult(beta, P) in let sks = mult(beta, XXMU2) in let MS2 = h1(concat(concat(XXMU2, MS1), concat(concat(sks, XXGIDi), SIDj))) in let MS3 = h(concat(concat(XXGIDi, SIDj), scj)) in out(chb, (MS1, MS2, MS3)); event endSj(SIDj).
h (c j ||GID i ||SID j ||MU 2 ), MS 3 = h (GID i ||SID j ||c j ) and other values. In addition, the value x in the 362 destination c j = h (SID j ||x) can not be determined because it is always used by hashing with SID j . Table 6 . Queries (*--queries--*) query attacker(P). query id:bitstring; inj-event(endUi(id)) ==> inj-event(beginUi(id)). query id:bitstring; inj-event(endGWN(id)) ==> inj-event(beginGWN(id)). query id:bitstring; inj-event(endSj(id)) ==> inj-event(beginSj(id)). In the login process, the user gives MU 1 , MU 2 , MU 3 , GID i , and SID j to the GW N. In this case, Because of the nature of ECCDH, we can not find αP and βP through αβP we can not find αβP 369 through αP and βP, and we can not find α through P and αP. The proposed scheme produced the best results in time among all the three factor user 377 authentication schemes using ECC (see Table 10 ). the security and performance of the proposed scheme are significantly better than the existing user 384 authentication schemes.
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